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Summary findings
Policymakers sometimes presume that adopting a less  The potential for inefficiency stems from two
polluting technology necessarily improves welfare. This  problems with the Pigouvian rule. First, the Pigouvian
view is generally mistaken. Adopting a cleaner  price does not discriminate against each unit of emissions
technology is costly, and this cost must be weighed  according to its marginal damage. Second, full ratcheting
against the technology's benefits in reduced pollution  of the emissions price in response to declining marginal
and reduced abatement costs.  damage as firms adopt the cleaner technology is correct
The literature to date has not satisfactorily examined  ex post but distorts incentives for adopting technology ex
whether emissions pricing properly internalizes this  ante.
tradeoff between costs and benefits. And if the trend  The next natural step for research is to examine
toward greater use of economic instruments in  second-best pricing policies or multiple instrument
environmental policy continues, as is likely, the  policies. The challenge is to design regulatory policies
properties of those instruments must be understood,  that go some way toward resolving p.oblems yet are
especially for dynamic efficiency.  geared to implementation in real regulatory settings.
Kennedy and Laplante examine incentives for adopting  Clearly, such policies must use more instruments than
cleaner technologies in response to Pigouvian emissions  emissions pricing alone. Direct taxes or subsidies for
pricing in equilibrium (unlike earlier analyses, which they  technological change, together with emissions pricing,
contend,  have been generally incomplete and at times  should give regulators more scope for creating
misleading).  appropriate  dynamic incentives. Such instruments are
Their results indicate that emissions pricing under the  already widely used: investment tax credits (for
standard Pigouvian rule leads to efficient equilibrium  environmental research and development), accelerated
adoption of technology only under certain circum-  depreciation (for pollution control equipment), and
stances. They show that the equilibrium level of adopting  environmental funds (to subsidize the adoption of
a public innovation is efficient under Pigouvian pricing  pollution control  equipment).
only if there are enough firms that each firm has a  Such direct incentives could be excessive, however, if
negligible effect on aggregate emissions. When those  emissions pricing is already in place. Ail incentives
circumstances are not satisfied, Pigouvian pricing does  should be coordinated.
not induce an efficient (social welfare-maximizing) level
of innovation.
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United StatesEXECUTIVE  SUMMMARY
This paper examines incentives for cleaner technology adoption in response  to
Pigouvian emissions pricing. There is sometimes a presumption among policy-makers
that the adoption of a less polluting technology necessarily improves social welfare. This
view  is  generally  mistaken. The  innovation and  adoption  of  a cleaner  technology  is
costly, and this cost must be weighed against the benefits of the new technology, in the
form of reduced pollution and reduced abatement costs. Wlhether  or not emissions pricing
properly internalizes this tradeoff between the costs and benefits of technological change
is a question that has not been addressed satisfactorily in the literature to date. We believe
it  is important to  fill that  gap.  If the current trend  towards greater use  of  economic
instruments in environmnental  policy continues (and there is every reason to believe that it
Nvill),  then  it  is crucial  that the  properties of  those  instruments  be  understood  fully,
especially  as  they  pertain  to  the  question  of  dynamic  efficiency.  Our  attention  to
incentives  in  equilibrium  distinguishes  our analvsis  from existing  work  in  this  area,
which has generally been incomplete and at times misleading.
Our results  indicate that emissions pricing according to the standard Pigouvian
rule  leads  to  efficient  equilibrium  technology  adoption  only  under  some  specific
circumstances. We characterize those circumstances in terms of the number of polluting
firms  and  whether or  not  marginal damage  is  increasing  in  aggregate  emissions.  In
particular, we show that if the number of firms is sufficiently large that each firm hias
negligible  effect on  aggregate emissions, then the equiiibrium  level of  adoption of  a
public innovation is efficient under Pigouvian pricing. Wihen  those circumstances are not
satisfied,  Pigouvian pricing does not  induce the efficient (social welfare maximising)
level of  innovation.  The  potential for  inefficiency sterns  from  two distinct  problems
associated with the Pigouvian rule. The first relates to the fact that the Pigouvian price
does not discriminate across each unit of emissions according to  its marginal damage.
Tlhe second  problem  relates  to  the ratcheting  of  the  cmissions  price  in  response  to
declining  marginal  damage  as  firms  adopt  the  cleaner  technology.  Full  ratcheting
according  to the Pigouvian rule ensures that he emissions price  is correct  ex post  but
distorts incentives for technology adoption ex ainte.
We  have  not  examined  second-best  pricing  policies  or  multiple  instrument
policies in this paper. To do so is the natural next step in this avenue of research. The
challenge  is  to  design  regulatory  policies  that  go  somne way  towards  resolving  the
problems we have highlighted hut at the same time are geared towards implementation in
real  regulatory  settings.  It  seems  clear  that  such  policies  will  need  to  use  more
instruments than emissions pricing alone. In particular. direct taxes or subsidies applied
to  technological  change,  used  in  concert  with  emissions  pricing,  are  likely  to  give
regulators greater scope in creating appropriate dynamic incentives. Such instruments are
alreadv  in  widespread  use,  usually  in  the  forrm of  investment  tax  credits  (for
environmental  R&D).  accelerated  depreciation  provisions  (for  pollution  control
equipment),  and the creation of  environmental funds (for subsidizing the adoption  of
pollution  control  equipment).  Our  results  suggest  that  these  direct  incentives  fortechnological change should be used with caution if emissions pricing is already in place;
the incentives so created could in fact be excessive. It is crucial that all instruments in
place  be  properly  coordinated  in  recognition  of  their  inter-related  incentive  effects.
Further research that  provides a  clearer understanding of those  effects can contribute
usefully to the design of real policy.1.  Introduction
One of the most important contributions of economic analysis to environmental
policy  has been to  demonstrate the potential  advantages  of incentive-based  regulation
over "command  and control". It is now well recognized that economic instruments that
attach a price to emissions, such as emission charges and tradeable emission permits, can
in many circumstances out-perform traditional command and control policies that simply
dictate what individual firms can and cannot do. Economic instruments have the potential
to  implement environmental quality targets at lower cost and with fewer informational
requirements  than  command  and  control  policies.j  Perhaps  most  important  of  all,
economic instruments create dynamic incentives for technological change. Conmmand  and
control policies that simply penalize a firn  for non-compliance with a specified standard
provide no incentive for that firm to employ cleaner production techniques beyond  the
point at which the regulatory constraint no longer binds. In contrast, policy instruments
that attach a price to every unit of emissions provide firms with an ongoing incentive to
reduce their emissions through the adoption of new technology if this can be achieved at
a cost lower than the price they are paying to emit.
However, dynamic efficiency requires that emissions pricing do more than simply
create ongoing incentives for technological change. It must create the right  incentives.
There  is  sometimes  a  presumption  among policy-makers  that the  adoption  of  a  less
I  See Bohm  and Russell  (1985),  Cropper  and Oates (1992),  and Tietenberg  (1991) for further
discussion  on the advantages  of incentive-based  instruments.
Ipolluting  technology  necessarily  improves  social  welfare.  This  view  is  generally
mistaken. The innovation and adoption of a cleaner technology is costly, and this  cost
must  be weighed  against the benefits of  the new  technology,  in the  form  of reduced
pollution  and  reduced  abatement  costs.  Whether  or  not  emissions  pricing  properly
internalizes  this  tradeoff  between the  costs and  benefits  of technological  change  is a
question that has not been addressed satisfactorily in the literature to date. We believe it is
important to fill that gap. If the current trend towards greater use of economic instruments
in environmental policy continues (and there is every reason to believe that it will), then
it is crucial that the properties of those instruments be understood fully, especially as they
pertain to the question of dynamic efficiency. The purpose of this paper is to provide a
systematic analysis of the circumstances under which emissions pricing does and does
not create efficient incentives for technological change.
There already exists an extensive literature on incentives for technological change
under environmental  regulation, but an analysis of the type we provide in this paper is
surprisingly absent from that literature.2 The papers most closely related to our own are
those  by Downing and White  (1986), and  Milliman and Prince (1989). Both  of these
papers  examine  the  incentives for technological change  under emissions  pricing.  We
devote section 5 of our paper to relating our work to these papers. At this point we wish
to  note only  that  the  main  shortcoming of  these papers  is that  they  fail to  consider
2  See  Milliman  and Prince (1989) for a survey  of literature previous to their paper. More recent
work includes Biglaiser and Horowitz  (1994), Laffont and Tirole  (1994), Requate (1994) and Xepapadeas
and Katsoulacos  (1994).
2incentives in equilibrium. This turns out to  be very significant. Our paper stresses the
importance  of  equilibrium  considerations.  We  focus  on  a  rational  expectations
equilibrium  in  which  firms  correctly  anticipate  the  behavior  of  other  firms  and  the
optimal response of the regulator.3
Our paper has a sharp focus in two respects. First. we do not examine incentives
for innovation. Our focus is on technology adoption. We believe it is most important to
gain an understanding of the adoption stage first because the incentives for innovation are
derived from the equilibrium incentives for adoption. Second, we focus on the standard
Pigouvian rule for emissions pricing. This rule relates the price of emissions to marginal
environmental damage. If the price of emissions is not tied to damage then there is no
reason to expect that the dynamic incentives induced by emissions pricing will properly
balance the full costs and benefits associated with technology adoption. Only a pricing
rule based  on damage  can hope to achieve that goal. We confine our attention to the
Pigouvian rule since it is the theoretical ideal in setting emission prices to induce static
efficiency. Our paper asks whether, and under what conditions, the Pigouvian rule also
induces dynamic efficiency.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we construct a simple
model that provides the basis for our analysis. In section 3 we examine the adoption of a
public innovation (for which no license fee is payable). We consider this case to highlight
3  We  comment  on the  appropriateness  of this particular  equilibrium  concept  in section  6.
3some  important  results  that  become  less  transparent  when  complicated  by  the
introduction of a patent holder. We consider the patented innovation case in section 4. In
section 5 we relate our results to the existing literature. We provide a brief summary of
our results and some thoughts on directions for future research in section 6.
2.  The Model
Time  is  divided  into  two  periods.  In  period  0  all  firms  use  a  production
technology  with associated  abatement  cost  MACO(e)  defined over  their  emissions  e.4
This schedule is illustrated in Figure  1. In the absence of emissions pricing, a firn  will
undertake no abatement and will produce emissions e  where MAC,(e)  = 0. We assume
that marginal abatement cost is increasing in abatement. Equivalently, MACo (e) < 0.  In
period I a cleaner technology becomes available with associated marginal abatement cost
MACI(e). This is also illustrated in Figure  1. We assume that MACI(e) is strictly lower
than MACO(e)  for all positive levels of abatementri The new technology can be adopted
by any  firm at some  fixed cost  A. This  represents the real cost of manufacturing  and
installing  the new  equipment.  We assume  constant returns  to  scale in  both  of  these
processes.  In  addition,  adopting  firms  may  also  have to  pay  a  license  fee  F to  the
innovator. We assume that the innovator is a firm outside the polluting industry. This is
consistent  with  real  economies  in  which  new  technologies are to  an  ever  increasing
The assumption that firms are initially homogeneous is deliberate. The reason will soon become
clear.
s  We have chosen to  focus on this case  because it allows us to present our main  insights in the
clearest way possible and because it ensures that our analytical structure is directly comparable to those
used in the existing literature.
4degree  developed  by specialist technology  firns  and  then licensed to polluting  firms.
There are n polluting firms in each period. 6
We  assume  that  private  and  social  marginal  abatement  costs  coincide.  This
implies that polluting firms are price-takers on the product market. It is important to note
that this assumption can hold even if the number of polluting firms in the regulated region
is small. The regulated firms do not necessarily constitute the whole industry. Such is the
case,  for example, when polluting  domestic  firms take  world market prices  as given.
While it may be  interesting to consider the case where firms have some  price-setting
power, we do not do so here. Our purpose is to examine technology adoption equilibria in
response to emissions pricing in the most transparent setting possible. This requires that
we abstract from distortions induced by market failures elsewhere. 7
Marginal environmental damage is a  function of aggregate emissions  E and  is
denoted MD(E). We make the standard assumption that MD'(E) > 0. The regulator sets
the price of emissions (either directly through a charge or indirectly through the supply of
tradeable permits) according to the standard Pigouvian rule. This means that in period
zero the price of emissions is set equal to po =_  MD(Eo), where E;  is the optimal level of
6  We abstract from the possibility  of entry in the post-innovation  period  to ensure,  once again,  that
our analysis  is directly  comparable  to the existing  literature.
?  It is well-known  that imperfect  competition  in the product  market  calls for the distortion of the
standard Pigouvian  pricing rule [Buchanan  (1969), Lee (1975), Bamett (1980)].  Such a distortion  will in
tum distort  technology  adoption  decisions  induced  by emissions  pricing.
5aggregate  emissions  in  period  0  given  by  the  standard  condition  equating  marginal
damage with marginal abatement cost for each firm:8
(1)  MD(EO) = MAC0(Eo / n)
We assume that the regulator continues to apply the Pigouvian pricing rule in period  1.
This means that the price of emissions is adjusted to take account of the reduced marginal
abatement costs for firms that adopt the new technology. This policy adjustment is called
ratcheting.  The adjusted price is set as follows. Let a  denote the fraction of firms that
adopt the new technology, and let e1, and eIo denote, respectively, the emissions in period
I  for a firm that adopts the new technology and a firm that retains the old technology.
Then the Pigouvian rule requires that the price of emissions in period 1, p;,  be set equal
to MD(E,),  where E,  is the optimal level of emissions in period I given that a fraction Cc
of  the  firms  have  adopted  the  new  technology.  This  optimal  level  of  emissions  is
determined by the equality of marginal damage and marginal abatement cost equalized
across firms:
(2)  MD(E')=  MACI(e 1)=  MAC,(e 0)
where
(3)  E,=  noe; 1 , + n(l - a)e 0 o
It is clear  that  p, < pO when a  > 0 since MACI(e) < MACO(e)  at any given level  of
emissions below  e.  Firms will rationally expect the regulator to ratchet the emissions
n  n
The  planning  problem  is to choose  ei to min D(E)  + EACo  (ei)  s.t.  e i = E, where  D(E) is
i=l  i=I
damage  and  ACO  (e 1) is abatement  cost. If MD'(E) 2 0 and MAC'(e)  > 0, then the solution  is equation
(9.
6price in this way unless the regulator can commit to an announced alternative rule. In
section 4 we explain why the regulator might like to be able to commit to an alternative
rule despite the fact that the Pigouvian rule is efficient ex post.
3.  A Public Innovation
We begin our analysis by supposing that the innovation is public and so can be
adopted  without  the  payment  of  a  license  fee.  We  present  this  case  mainly  for
pedagogical reasons. It is well known that knowledge, once created, is a public good and
efficiency ex post requires that all agents have access to it regardless of their willingness
to pay. But in order to create ex ante incentives for the creation of the new knowledge, it
is  necessary  to  price  it  ex  post,  and  this  will  generally  exclude  some  potential
beneficiaries. Limited patents and copyrights are designed to trade-off these conflicting
objectives. We wish to abstract initially from this standard problem in order to focus on
the elements of the issue that are peculiar to the environmental setting. In section 4 we
examine the case where the innovation is patented.
In this section, we consider first the case where the number of firms is sufficiently
large that each firm has negligible impact on aggregate emissions. We then turn to the
case where the number of firms is small and firms act strategically in their technology
adoption decisions.
73.1  When the number of firms is large
We begin by deriving the efficient level of adoption as the solution to a planning
problem. We then compare this efficient solution to the rational expectations equilibrium
outcome.
gdlciency
It is important to  note at the outset that the efficient solution may not  involve
universal  adoption  of  the  cleaner  technology.  This  point  has  generally  not  been
recognized in the literature to date. The intuition behind this point can be explained most
easilv with the aid of Figure 2 which illustrates the marginal abatement cost and marginal
damage schedules for an individual firm. The md(e) schedule represents the marginal
damage of the emissions from an individual firmn  drawn for a given level of emissions
from other firms. The md(e) schedule has zero slope  even if  MD'(E) > 0 because the
individual firm has a negligible impact on aggregate emissions. If a firm adopts the new
technology, then society derives a gain indicated by the shaded region. This social gain
comprises the cost reduction on existing abatement  (e - e0 )  plus the net benefit from
additional  abatement  (el, -e 1)  undertaken once the new technology is installed. This
gain from adoption must be weighed against the cost of adoption when assessing whether
or not the firmn  should adopt the new technology. Recall that the cost of adoption for any
firrn is independent of the number of firms that adopt (by the constant returns to scale
assumption). However, when  MD'(E) > 0, the gain from  adoption is decreasing in the
number of firms that adopt. This is because the damage done by the emissions from any
one firm falls as more firms adopt the new technology and cut their emissions, thereby
8reducing MD(E). This means that md(e) schedule for any individual firm shifts down as
more firms adopt the new technology. The shaded area in Figure 2 therefore shrinks as
the number of adopting firms rises. If A > 0, then the gain from one firm adopting the
cleaner technology may fall below A for a value of o strictly less than one. Thus, strictly
partial adoption may be optimal when A > 0 and MD'(E) > 0.
If A =  0, then universal adoption is  clearly the optimal solution  regardless of
whether or not MD'(E)  > 0. Similarly, if MD'(E) = 0, then partial adoption will never be
optimal. In this second case, the md(e) schedule in Figure 2 will not shift down as the
aggregate level of emissions falls. The optimal solution will then involve either cc = I or
a = 0 according to whether or not the gain from adoption by any firm is greater than or
less than A. Thus,  MD'(E) > 0 is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for optimal
partial adoption.
To gain further insights, we need to be somewhat more formal. Let C(ca) be the
sum of abatement cost, damage and adoption costs when a fraction a  of firms adopt the
new technology, and emissions from adopting and non-adopting firms are set optimally
using the Pigouvian pricing rule. That is,
(4)  C(a) = na  fMACj (e)de+  n(_a)  JMACO(e)de+  JMD(E)dE±+anA
9 10 0
9where  en,  e;l  and  E,  are given by equations (2) and  (3). The planning problem is to
choose cc  to minimize this cost. The first-order condition for an interior integer solution
.9
is
(5)  fMACO(e)de - fMACI (e)de1+ MD(E  )(e0 - e1 ) =  A
el,,  e,,
This condition can be interpreted in terms of Figure 2. The LHS represents the social gain
when one more firm adopts the new technology. This is the shaded area in Figure 2. The
first (bracketed) termn  represents the abatement cost  reduction associated with  the new
technology. The second terrn represents the reduced damage associated with additional
abatement under the new technology. The RHS represents the cost of adoption  for the
marginal firm. Condition (5) therefore implies that the benefit and cost of adoption by the
marginal firm are just equated at the optimum.'0
To complete our characterization of the efficient solution, we must also consider
the possible corner solutions. If AC(a)  / aa  2 0 at a  =  0, then efficiency requires that no
firms adopt the new technology. This situation arises when A is very large relative to the
magnitude of the shift in the MAC schedule. Conversely, if AC(a) / act  < 0 at a  =  1, then
efficiency  requires  universal  adoption.  This  occurs  when  A  is  small  relative  to  the
9  Allowing  for the possibility  that  the first-best  value  of an  is not an integer  complicates  the
analysis but does not provide  any additional  insights. We therefore  maintain the integer assumption
throughout.
'°  The second-order  conditions  for  a minimum  are  satisfied  by  our  assumptions  that  MAC'(e)  > 0
and MD'(E) 2 0.
10magnitude of the innovation. As noted earlier, if A  =  0, universal adoption  is always
optimal.
EquilibrLium
We now turn to the equilibrium level of adoption. We confine consideration to a
rational expectations equilibrium in which each firm correctly anticipates that the price of
emissions in period I will be set according to the Pigouvian rule based on the fraction a
of firms that adopt the new technology. In the case where n is large, each firm takes that
fraction as given and independent of its own adoption decision. This means that each firm
views the price of emissions in period I as independent of its own adoption decision. If a
fraction a of firms adopt the new technology, and the price of emissions is set according
to the Pigouvian rule, then the price in period 1 will be
(6)  pi (a)  = MD(nae,  l + n(1-  a)e 0 o)
Faced with this anticipated price of emissions, each firm decides whether or not to adopt
the new technology according to whether or not the net private benefit from doing so is
positive. The net private benefit from adoption is
(7)  B(a) = L  IMACO  (e)de + p 1 (a)e;O  JIlMAC,  (e)de + p 1 (a)e,,  ]-  A
This net benefit represents the difference between the sum of abatement  cost and tax
payments under the two technologies, less the cost of adoption. Note that the firm bases
its decision on the levels of emissions it expects to produce under the two alternatives,
which by design, are the efficient levels induced by the Pigouvian pricing rule.
IIIt is straightforward to show that B(a)  is declining in a  when MD'(E) > 0. The
reason is that aggregate emissions decline as more firms adopt the new technology, and
this reduces marginal damage when MD'(E) > 0. This means that the price of emissions
falls as  more firms  adopt, and  this  in  turn reduces the private  gain to  the firm  from
adopting  the new  technology.  This  relationship  between B(oa) and  a  is  illustrated  in
Figure 3.
We  can  now  characterize  the  equilibrium  level  of  adoption  and  examine  its
efficiency properties. The interior rational expectations equilibrium occurs at & where
B(a)  = 0. At levels of adoption below &, the net private benefit to a firm from adoption
is positive and further adoption is thereby induced. Once the level of adoption reaches &,
adoption by one more firm would yield a negative net benefit to that firn  and so it will
choose not to adopt. Of course, there may not exist an interior equilibrium if A is very
large or very small. If Bo(a)  < 0 at a = 0, as might be the case if A is very large, then no
firms adopt in equilibrium. Conversely, if B(a) > 0 at a = 1, as might be the case if A is
very small, then all firmns  adopt in equilibrium. Note that if MD'(E) = 0, then B'(a)  = 0,
and so partial adoption is never an equilibrium in that special case.
Is the rational expectations equilibrium efficient? A comparison of equations (5)
and (7) reveals that it is. Recall that p, (a) = MD(E,)  when the price of emissions is set
according to the Pigouvian rule. Making this substitution for pl(a)  in equation (7) reveals
that  B(cx) and  EC(a) / ac  are  exactly  equivalent.  It  follows  immediately  that  the
12equilibrium  level of adoption is efficient (for both the interior and corner cases). This
result is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition  1. If the number of firms is sufficiently large that each firm has negligible
effect  on  aggregate  emissions,  and  the  price  of  emissions  is  set  according  to  the
Pigouvian rule, then the equilibrium level of adoption of a public innovation is efficient.
The key to this result is the Pigouvian pricing rule. Setting the price of emissions equal to
marginal  damage  not  only  induces  static  efficiency  but  dynamic  efficiency  as  well.
Ratcheting the emissions price according to the Pigouvian rule ensures that the effect of
any decline in marginal damage is fully internalized in technology adoption decisions.
The anticipated price  of emissions  correctly tracks the declining marginal damage  as
more firms adopt the technology, and this creates the correct adoption incentives.
The  central policy  implication of proposition  I  is that  ratcheting the  price of
emissions in response to new technology adoption according to the Pigouvian rule (and
announcing this rule to firms), is necessary and sufficient to ensure dynamic efficiency, if
the number of firms is large and the innovation is public. But what if these qualifying
conditions  are not met? We examine the implications of a patent on the innovation in
section 4. In the next sub-section, we look at the case where the number of firms is small.
133.2  When the number of firms is small
Suppose the number of firms is sufficiently small that each firm has a significant
effect on aggregate emissions. This has substantive implications for technology adoption
only  in  the case where  marginal damage  is increasing.  If  MD'(E) = 0, then marginal
damage is independent of the adoption decision of any individual firm and the analysis of
the previous  sub-section continues  to  apply. But  if  MD'(E) > 0  and  each firm has  a
significant effect on E, then marginal damage is not independent of individual technology
adoption decisions. For the remainder of this sub-section, we therefore restrict attention to
the case where MD'(E)  > 0.
We begin our analysis with Figure 4 which is the analogue of Figure 2 for the case
where  n  is  small.  The  marginal  damage  schedule  md(e)  reflects  marginal  damage
associated with the emissions of a single firm drawn for a given level of emissions by
other  firms.  This  schedule  has  positive  slope  in  this  case  because  each  firm has  a
significant effect on aggregate emissions, and marginal damage is increasing in aggregate
emissions."  The shaded  area represents the social gain from adoption by an individual
firm. The md(e) schedule shifts down when other firms adopt the technology -just  as it
does in the case where n is large - and so the social gain to adoption shrinks. The efficient
(interior)  level  of adoption  is determined by  the point where  the shaded  area for  the
marginal firm is just equal to the cost of adoption. The mathematics defining this efficient
Note that  if MD'(E) = 0, then Figure  2 and Figure  4 are identical.
14point is  identical to  that for the case where n  is large; the condition  for efficiency  is
equation (5).
Now consider the private incentive to adopt the new technology. The private gain
from adoption is represented by the shaded area in Figure  5. This  shaded area can be
interpreted as follows. If the firm retains the old technology, then it correctly anticipates
an emissions price equal to plo (set according to the Pigouvian rule, given that this firm
does  not  adopt the  new technology).  It would  then  abate up  to  em and  so incur  an
abatement cost equal to the area beneath MACo between e o and e . It also incurs the cost
of paying a price Plo on its remaining emissions, equal to the area p10e;0. If instead the
firm adopts the new technology (taking the adoption decisions of other firms as given),
then marginal damage will fall (along the md(e) schedule) because the firm is "large",
and so the firm will correctly anticipate a price of emissions equal to pll  < plo. That is,
the firm recognizes that its own adoption decision will affect the price of emissions as
determined by the Pigouvian rule. The total cost to the firm under the new technology is
therefore equal to the area beneath MAC, between e;, and  e-, plus the area  pl,e;,.  The
difference between these total costs for the two technologies is the shaded area in Figure
5.
It  is  clear  from  figures  4 and  5 that  the private  gain to  technology  adoption
exceeds the social gain. Downing and White (1986) derive an analogous result for the
case  of  a  single polluting  firm.  They  explain  their  result  correctly  as  follows.  The
15Pigouvian  pricing  rule  levies  a  price  equal  to  the  damage  on  the  marginal  unit  of
emissions of all units of emissions. This means that the total payment for a given level of
emissions exceeds the total damage associated with those emissions if marginal damage
is increasing.  Because the private gain from adopting a new technology  stems  in part
from the reduced emission fees payable after adoption, and because this reduction in fees
payable exceeds the reduced damage done, the private  gain from adoption exceeds the
social gain.
It  is important to understand that this  excessive incentive to adopt the cleaner
technology  is  not  due  solely  to  the  strategic  interaction  between  the  regulator  and
individual  firms.  Figure  6  illustrates  the  perceived private  gain from  adoption  for  a
mnyopic  firm that anticipates no ratcheting of the emissions price in response to its own
adoption decision. It takes the emissions price as given in the same way as the "small"
firms of  the previous  sub-section. The  perceived private  gain in  this  myopic  case  is
smaller than when the firm anticipates ratcheting but it is nonetheless greater than the true
social gain. The source of the problem is not the ratcheting per  se. The problem stems
from the fact that the Pigouvian pricing rule does not price each unit of emissions at its
marginal damage when marginal damage is increasing. There is no associated distortion
of the adoption decision when firms are small because marginal damage  is effectively
constant  wvith respect  to  their  emissions  even  if  marginal  damage  is  increasing  in
aggregate emissions. This is not true when firms are large. A reduction in their emissions
16does reduce marginal damage and so the reduced tax payments overstates the social gain.
The strategic interaction induced by ratcheting merely exacerbates this distortion.
We now characterize the adoption equilibrium more formally and show that it will
generally involve excessive adoption of the new technology. Consider a firm which takes
as given the adoption decisions of the other n - 1 firms. Suppose that m of those  firms
adopt the new technology. If the firm in question adopts the new technology then it will
face an emissions price in period 1 equal to
(8)  p,  (m) = MD((m+  l)e11 (p 11 ) + (n - m-  l)e1O(p 1j))
where ell(p1j) and elo(p 1l)  solve pll(m)  = MACO(elo)  = MACI(ell).  If, instead, the firm
chooses to retain the old technology, it will face an emissions price in period 1 equal to
(9)  plo(m) = MD(me  1 (p 1 o) + (n-  m)e1o(pjo))
where  ell(plo)  and  elo(plo) solve  plo(m) = MACO(elo)  =  MACI(el).  The  private  net
benefit to adoption by the (m+1  )  t  adopting firm is therefore given by
(10)  B(m) =L  |ACo(e)de+plo(m)eIo(Plo)]
l  J|MACe  (e)de + p  1(m)e, (p,, )]  A
ell(pil)
It is straightforward to show that  B'(m) < 0  when  MD'(E) > 0, for precisely the same
reason that B'(a)  < 0 in the case where n is large: the Pigouvian pricing rule dictates that
the emissions price fall with marginal damage as more firms adopt the cleaner technology
17and  cut  their  emissions.  The  interior  rational  expectations  equilibrium  is  therefore
characterized by adoption by mi firms such that B(mh)  = 0.  12
We now  compare  this  equilibrium  with  the  interior  social  optimum  m*. Our
approach is to examine the sigh of B(m*). From this we can determine the direction of
any distortion in equilibrium.  We know that elo(plo(m*)) = e;0 because m* is the social
optimum (and so a decision by the (m* + 1)  th firm not to adopt when facing an anticipated
emissions price p10(m*)  must be efficient). Making this substitution in (10) yields
Fr-  1
(11)  B(m*)=1LMAC 0 (e)de+pj 0 (m  )e 0J
elo
{  MAC,(e)de+p,,(m')e,(p,,)  -A
Noting that p 10 (m)  = MD(E;),  by definition of m  as the social optimum, and assuming
that m* is an integer, we can use equation (5) to subtract  aC  / aa = 0 from the RHS of
(11) to obtain
(12)  B(m)=[It  MACi(e)de+pw0(m')eij]-{  |MAC,(e)de+p,,(m)eji(pj,)]
eli(Pii)
This  difference  is  illustrated  as  the  shaded  area  in  Figure  7.  We  know  that
p, 1(m')  < pl0(m')  when MD'(E) > 0 because adoption of the cleaner technology by one
more  firm  reduces  marginal  damage,  and  we  know  that  eo0  <e1 I(p  )  because
MAC, (e) < 0. It follows that B(m)  > 0. That is, there is a strictly positive private net
12  We continue to assume an integer solution.
18benefit from adoption for at least one more firm beyond the efficient level of adoption.
This means that equilibrium will involve excessive adoption relative to the interior social
optimum. We summarize this result in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. If each firm has a significant effect on aggregate emissions and marginal
damage is increasing, and the price of emissions is set according to the Pigouvian rule,
and the social optimum is an interior and integer one, then too many firms will adopt a
public innovation in equilibrium.
We have already noted that the source of this inefficiency is the fact that the savings in
emissions fees for the firm exceeds the reduction in damage when the price of emissions
is set according to the Pigouvian rule and marginal damage is increasing. This distortion
disappears when n is sufficiently large because marginal damage is effectively constant
with respect to the emissions of any individual firm.'3 There may also be no distortion if
the social optimum is a corner solution. In particular, if m  = n then  iii = n, and there is
no inefficiency. That is, if the innovation is so significant relative to its adoption cost that
it should  be adopted by all firms,  then it will be adopted by all firms  in equilibrium.
Conversely, if efficiency requires that no firms adopt the new technology, then this may
also be supported  as an equilibrium  if the difference between the private  gain and  the
social gain is not too large (which requires that marginal damage for each firm not be too
1  3  This  can be seen  clearly  in expression  (12): p,1(m*) -)  plo(mi) as n  a:because  small  firns
correctly  perceive  that their adoption  decision  will have no effect on the price of emissions,  and so
e,,  (p,,)  - e  1 .It follows  that B(m') -O0.
19strongly  increasing).  In  all  other cases,  there  will be  excessive  adoption  of  the  new
technology.
The solution to this problem is in principle straightforward: emissions should be
priced  according  to  a  discriminating  pricing  rule  that  sets  the price  of  each  unit  of
emissions  equal  to  the  marginal damage  of  that  unit.  This  will  eliminate the  wedge
between  the  private  and  social  gain to  technology  adoption  while at  the  same  time
preserving  the  static  efficiency  condition  that  marginal  abatement  cost  and  marginal
damage be  equated  at the optimum  in each period. However, implementing this  ideal
solution  is  likely  to  be  difficult  in  practice  due  to  the  informational  requirements
involved. We comment further on this problem in section 6.
4.  Equilibrium  adoption of a patented innovation
We now suppose that adopting firns  must pay a license fee to the patent holder.




where F is the license fee, and m(F) is the anticipated number of firms that will choose to
adopt  the  innovation.  The  patent  holder  calculates  m(F)  correctly  as  the  rational
expectations  equilibrium  level of adoption  given the  license fee. It  turns out that  the
14  We assume  that  the patent  holder cannot  price discriminate  across  firms  when  setting the license
fee.
20welfare implications of the license fee depend importantly on whether marginal damage
is constant or increasing in aggregate emissions. We consider each case in turn.
4.1  Constant marginal damage
When marginal damage is constant, there is no ratcheting of the emissions price in
response to technology adoption. This means the private benefit to adoption (B) does not
depend on the number of firms that adopt. Hence, the m(F) schedule faced by the patent
holder  is perfectly elastic. The patent  holder will induce  universal adoption  if  it sets
F < B, and no adoption if it sets F > B. If B>  0, then the profit-maximizing solution is to
set F = B - E where £ is arbitrarily small. This will induce universal adoption and this is
efficient because B reflects the true social gain to adoption when MD'(E) = 0. If instead
B < 0, then the privately optimal solution is to set F = 0. This will induce no adoption and
this too is efficient. There is therefore no distortion of the adoption equilibrium when a
license fee is introduced if marginal damage in aggregate emissions is constant. Note that
this result holds regardless of whether n is large or small because there is no effective
difference between these cases when MD'(E) = 0. We summarize the result as follows.
Proposition 3. If marginal damage in aggregate emissions is constant, and the price of
emissions is set according to the Pigouvian rule, then the patent holder sets a license fee
that induces the efficient level of technology adoption.
21It should be noted that this result relies on the assumption that all firms are identical. If
firms  are heterogeneous  in their  willingness  to  pay for  the innovation  then the m(F)
schedule  will  be  negatively  sloped  and  the  adoption  equilibrium  will  generally  be
distorted. Such a distortion would reflect the usual ex ante - ex post tradeoff associated
with awarding a patent.  We have focused deliberately on the homogeneous case so as
to highlight the issues that are peculiar to the environmental setting. in particular, in the
next sub-section we show that the ex-ante - ex post efficiency tradeoff arises even when
firms are homogeneous if marginal damage is increasing in aggregate emissions.
4.2  Increasing marginal damage
Recall from section 3.2 that increasing marginal damage means that  B'(m) < 0
when the price of emissions is ratcheted according to the Pigouvian rule. This means that
the m(F) schedule is negatively sloped since the gain to adoption for any firm (and hence
their willingness to pay for a license) falls as more firms adopt. An interior solution to the
patent holder's problem is characterized by the familiar monopoly condition
(14)  m(F) + m'(F)F =  O
This condition states that the license fee should be raised to the point where marginal
revenue  is  zero.  We  know  that  the  m(F)  schedule  is  characterized  by  the  adoption
equilibrium condition  B(m) = F if the equilibrium is interior and integer. Making this
substitution  in  (14) and  rearranging yields  an expression  for the  equilibrium  level  of
adoption of the patented innovation:
(15)  B(m)/ m = -B'(m)
1  5  See  Biglaiser  and Horowitz  (1995)  for  an  analysis  of this  problem  in an  environmental  setting.
They  assume  MD'(E) = 0 and  heterogeneous  firns.
22The solution to this condition is depicted as fmi  in Figure 8. The LHS of (15) represents
the slope of the dashed ray. The RHS of (15) represents the slope of the B(m) schedule.
The dashed ray is orthogonal to the B(m) schedule at the equilibrium. For comparison,
the (interior) equilibrium level of adoption for a public innovation is depicted in Figure 8
as m:n.  It is clear that fmi  < rm.  This is as expected: the license fee reduces the net benefit to
adoption and leads to less adoption in equilibrium. The only possible exceptions are at the
corner solutions. If B(O)  < 0, then mfi  = iii = 0. The patent holder will choose not to induce
any adoption when B(O)  < 0 because to do so would require setting a negative license fee.
At the other extreme, if B(m) is sufficiently steep at m = n, then mi= n. It follows that
m = m = 0 in that case.
The key question of interest is whether im is smaller or larger than the first-best
level  of adoption  m.  The answer  is clear  in the  case where  n is  large.  Recall from
proposition  I that  if n is sufficiently large then  mi  = m'.  Since ih < mi, it follows that
fh < m'  in that case, except when m* = 0 (in which case  ii = m').  We can summarize this
result as follows.
Proposition 4. If the number of firms is sufficiently large that each firm has a negligible
effect  on  aggregate  emissions  and  marginal  damage  is  increasing,  and  the  price  of
emissions is set according to the Pigouvian rule, and at least some adoption of the new
technology  is efficient, then the patent holder sets a  license fee that  induces too  little
adoption.
23This result reflects the familiar ex post inefficiency associated with the monopoly pricing
of  a  patented  innovation.  However,  it  is  important  to  understand  that  in  this
environmental setting this result is linked directly to the ratcheting of the emissions price.
The private gain to a firm from adopting the new technology falls as more firms adopt it,
because the regulator ratchets down the price of emissions in line with declining marginal
damage. This causes the demand curve faced by the patent holder to be negatively sloped
even though firms are homogeneous ex ante. The standard monopoly welfare result then
applies directly.
Note that  if the emissions  price is not ratcheted then the B(m)  schedule is not
declining in m and the m(F) schedule is perfectly elastic. The patent holder would then
set F to induce either no adoption or universal adoption (just as in the MD'(E) = 0 case).
Of course this will generally not be an efficient outcome either. The level of technology
adoption will generally be wrong, and the emissions price will be too high ex post (unless
no adoption  happens  to  be  efficient).  However, there  is no  reason  to expect  that  the
inefficiency  associated  with  not  ratcheting  will  necessarily  be  greater  than  the
inefficiency induced by ratcheting. The key problem is that the regulator is faced with the
conflicting goals of inducing the right level of technology adoption and setting the correct
emissions price ex post. The second-best solution to this dilemma is unlikely to be full
ratcheting according to the standard Pigouvian rule, since this puts exclusive emphasis on
achieving the correct ex post emissions price. The second-best pricing policy will likely
24involve partial ratcheting which trades off the competing ex ante and ex post goals in an
optimal way. Of course. this requires that the regulator be able to pre-commit to a tax rate
that is sub-optimal ex post.
We complete our analysis in this section by examining the case where the number
of firms is small. The efficiency properties of the equilibrium induced by full ratcheting
in this case are ambiguous. Recall from section 3.2 that the non-discriminating nature of
the standard Pigouvian pricing rule tends to induce excessive technology adoption when
marginal  damage  is  increasing  and  the  number  of  firmns is  srnall.  This  effect  can
potentially offset the tendency towards under-adoption induced by full ratcheting when
the technology  is patented. The net effect is therefore ambiguous except  in the special
case where n = 1. In that case, there can never be under-adoption. We have seen from
section 3.2 that a single firm will never choose non-adoption of a public innovation  if
adoption  is  efficient.  The  same must  be  true of  a  patented adoption.  If  adoption  is
efficient, then the firm would choose to  adopt if F = 0. The patent holder would then
never set a license fee that induces non-adoption since doing so is always less profitable
than setting a lower (but still positive) fee that induces adoption.
5.  Relation to existing literature
One purpose of our paper is to clarify and place in context some existing results in
the literature. Our discussion here will focus on papers by Downing and White (1986)
and Milliman and Prince (1989).
25Downing and White (1986) provide a graphical analysis for the  case of a single
firm and examine its incentive to adopt a public innovation. They assume that marginal
damage  is  increasing and distinguish between  marginal ansd non-marginal innovations
according  to whether or not marginal damage changes. We have instead focused  on a
discrete  innovation  and  distinguished  cases  on  the basis  of whether  or not  marginal
damage is constant or increasing. The two approaches are technically equivalent for the
single firm case (although our approach allows a clearer interpretation of results in more
general cases). We have already noted in section 3 what we believe to be the key result in
the Downing and White paper: the standard non-discriminating Pigouvian pricing  rule
creates excessive incentives for cleaner technology adoption when marginal damage  is
increasing because the reduction in emissions fees associated with technology adoption
exceeds the reduction in damage.
Downing and White also consider briefly the case where there is a large number
of firms. They assert that the results for the single firm case can simply be re-interpreted
as applying to a large number of firms.16 We have shown that this is not correct. The
confusion in Downing and White seems to stem from their failure to consider incentives
in equilibrium. They assume implicitly that each small firm expects every other firm to
make the same decision it makes (as if it were making decisions on behalf of all firms).
This expectation is not fulfilled in equilibrium.
16  Downing  and  White  (1986. p. 24).
26Milliman and Prince (1989) focus on incentives for innovation. They model an
industry with many polluting firms in which a single firm innovates a new technology.
They  then  examine  how  emission  pricing  affects  the  "diffusion"  (adoption)  of  that
technology and how this in turn affects incentives to innovate. Their analysis differs from
ours most notably in that it is not an equilibrium analysis. Adoption decisions are not
modeled  explicitly and  there is no consideration given to  whether or not the adoption
outcomes  that are presupposed can in fact be equilibria.  It turns out  that they can be
equilibria only under certain conditions. In particular, Milliman and Prince assume that
adoption of  the new  technology  is universal,  regardless of  whether the  innovation  is
public or patented. We have shown that his is an assured equilibrium under Pigouvian
ratcheting only if adoption is free. The problem in Milliman and Prince stems from their
assumption  that  firms  anticipate no  ratcheting  of  the emissions  price  in  response  to
technology adoption even when ratcheting does occur. This assumption is not consistent
with rational, forward-looking behavior.'7
6.  Conclusion
In this paper, we have examined incentives for cleaner technology adoption in
response  to  Pigouvian emissions  pricing.  Our attention  to  equilibrium  considerations
distinguishes  our  analysis  from  existing  work  in  this  area.  Our principal results  are
1  7  Malueg  (1989) and Requate  (1994) also  examine  technology  adoption  under  emissions  pricing.
They  too abstract  from  equilibrium  considerations  and their results  should  be interpreted  cautiously.
Requate  (1994)  examines  properly  the equilibrium  between  firms  for a given  policy,  but still  assumes  that
firms anticipate  no policy  adjustment  in response  to technology  adoption,  even  when such adjustment  does
occur ex post.
27summarized as propositions  I  to 4. The main thrust of  these results  is that emissions
pricing according to the standard Pigouvian rule leads to efficient technology adoption
only under some circumstances. We have characterized those circumstances in terms of
the  number of  polluting  tirms  and  whether or  not  marginal  damage  is  increasing  in
aggregate emissions.
The potential for inefficiency stems from two distinct problems associated with
the  Pigouvian  rule.  The  first  relates  to  the  {act  that  Pigouvian  pricing  does  not
discriminate across each unit of emissions according to its marginal damage. This means
that when marginal damage  is increasing, the total emission fees paid by "large" firms
exceed the damage  caused by their emissions.  This in  turn  tends to  induce excessive
adoption  of  cleaner  technology.  The  second  problem  arises  when  the  technology  is
patented, and  relates  to  the  ratcheting of the emission  price  in response  to  declining
marginal damage as more firms adopt the cleaner technology. Full ratcheting according to
the Pigouvian rule ensures that the emissions price is correct ex post but at the same time
distorts  technology adoption through its impact on the elasticity of the patent holder's
demand curve. It is generally not possible to achieve efficient pricing ex post and at the
same time  create the rights  incentives for technology adoption ex  ante  using a  single
instrument.
All of our main results are derived in a rational expectations equilibrium context
and  we should  comment on  the reasonableness of  that equilibrium concept.  Rational
28expectations  is  a  strong  behavioral  assumption.  It  places  signigicant  rationality  and
informational  requirements on1  the  regulated firms,  requirements that  real-world  firms
probably do not meet. Ideally. we would like to work with a model in which  firms are
forward-looking but boundedly rational. Unfortunately. inodels of bounded rationality are
not  vet developed  to  the point where  they can be  used to  analyze the sort  of policy
problems we have examined here. One alternative is to assume that firms are completely
myopic, as other models in this literature have done. We believe that this is probablv an
even  poorer  approximation  to  reality  than  our  rational  expectations  assumption.
Nonetheless, it is worth speculatinig  briefly on the sensitivitv of our results to deviations
from rational expectations. In general, one would expect that small "mistakes" by firms in
their technology adoption decisions are more likely io precipitate long run outcomes with
more technology  adoption  than our  equilibrium results  indicate  rather than  less.  The
reason  relates  to  the  sunkness  of  technology  adoption.  In the  event  of  a  short  run
disequilibrium  outcome  with  under-adoption  (relative  to  the  rational  expectations
equilibrium), firms can respond with further technology adoption. But the converse may
not  be  true. If technology  adoption  is sunk then there  may he  no  wav of  profitably
undoing an adoption decision that is regretted ex post. Thiat is, over-adoption (relative to
the rational expectations  equilibrium) mav he an cx post equilibrium  to the perturbed
game if undoing technology adoption decisions is costly.18
I8  We  should  stress  that  these claims  are  speculative.  We have  not examined  the  perturbed  game
forrnally.We  have  not  examined  second-best  pricing  policies  or  multiple  instrument
policies  in this paper. To do so is the natural next step in this avenue of research. The
challenge  is  to  design  regulatory  policies  that  go  some  way  towards  resolving  the
problems we have highlighted but at the same time are geared towards implementation in
real  regulatory  settings.  It  seems  clear  that  such  policies  will  need  to  use  more
instruments than emissions pricing alone. In particular, direct taxes or subsidies applied
to  technological  change,  used  in  concert  with  emissions  pricing,  are  likely  to  give
regulators greater scope in creating appropriate dynamic incentives. Such instruments are
already  in  widespread  use,  usually  in  the  form  of  investment  tax  credits  (for
environmental  R&D).  accelerated  depreciation  provisions  (for  pollution  control
equipment),  and the creation of environmental  funds (for subsidizing the adoption  of
pollution  control  equipment).  1 9 Our  results  suggest  that  these  direct  incentives  for
technological change should be used with caution if emissions pricing is already in place;
the incentives so created could in fact be excessive. It is crucial that all instruments in
place  be  properly  coordinated  in  recognition  of  their  inter-related  incentive  effects.
Further  research that  provides a  clearer understanding of those  effects can contribute
usefully to the design of  real policy.
19  See Lovei  (  1994)  and  Jenkins  and  Lamech  (1992) for  a thorough  description  of these  fiscal
incentives.
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